Music and Communism in North Korea

At a first glance it may seem the relationship between the communist regime of North Korea and music is a hostile one. Headlines detailing the arrest and subsequent defection of North Korean pianist Kim Cheol Woong in 2001 are just one example that may suggest to a casual reader that music has no place in the DPRK. Woong was a descendant of a notable political family, yet was accused of treachery for being overheard practising the ‘capitalist jazz’[1] of Richard Clayderman, a forbidden genre associated with drugs, western culture and the ‘vanities of capitalist life’.[2] However, North Korea is far from a society without music. From the DPRK’s foundation in 1945 to today, music has played a key role in its implementation of proletarian values, dissemination of ideology, and assertion on the world stage through engagement in cultural diplomacy. Through investigation of North Korean music discourses and their specific application, we can determine the extent of the role music has played in forming the distinct communist ideology that permeates all aspects of life in the DPRK.

Music’s significance in the rise of the North Korean nation state can be traced back to the early life of its founder, Kim Il-sung. His recognition of music’s power to influence and motivate began in childhood, being born into a religious family who encouraged him to participate in the musical life of the Protestant Mangyongdae church as an organist. Not only did this experience give him a theoretical grounding in music, but also a keen awareness of the important role music played in the spread of Christianity in Korea. Christian missionaries in Korea achieved great success through harnessing musical techniques and filling them with religious content, a powerful catalyst for cultural change attracting ‘bored’ Koreans who were looking for enjoyment, with music giving power to ‘snare even casual adherents’.[3] Kim himself noted this power, stating that ‘young men and women went to church in the past not because of belief in Christianity but to sing songs and keep each other’s company’.[4] This knowledge of the manipulative potential of music, in addition to his strong theoretical understanding was something that permeated throughout Kim Il-sung’s reign, with his writings from the 1940s being ‘punctuated with references to music’,[5] such as explanations of the emotional impact of D major in comparison to E major, stating that E major was more likely to make people ‘rush forward involuntarily’[6] – a concept derived from European music theory from the likes of Schumann. Kim’s attitude towards Christianity eventually took an unfavourable turn due to its association with anti-soviet sentiments, resulting in the burning of churches in the North Pyongan province. However, despite his break from the church of Christianity, Kim utilised heavily the missionaries’ musical techniques of indoctrination in the foundation of the DPRK, replacing protestant content with that of the proletarian.

One of the key principles of Kim’s early regime was the militarisation of all aspects of society. In 1945, developing a ‘military spirit’ among his early population, particularly in the youth, was a first priority. The use of ‘Nation Building Rooms’ allowed young cadets to ‘trace the patriotic struggle of our people, especially the heroic struggle of the Anti-Japanese Guerilla Army [and] enjoy their leisure time reading books and singing songs’.[7] One particular goal of the anti-Japanese regime was to remove the Japanese influence on Korean art, something that had emerged late in Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1942, evidenced through North Korea’s use of five-staff Western notation, for example. Kim applied his militarisation of society to the arts, encouraging North Korean orchestral musicians to become soldiers of a nationalistic culture, with a goal of wiping out all Japanese influence, aiming to ‘guarantee every possible condition for the advancement of national arts’.[8] For Kim, these musicians were active participants in the construction of the North Korean state, treating them as ‘soldiers fighting with art as a weapon’.[9] These combative and aggressive sentiments were deemed essential components in the creation of a national anthem, with Kim calling for a united effort from the entire North Korean artistic community to ‘produce songs that would inspire patriotism in the people’.[10] His requirements for a suitable anthem for the new proletarian Korean identity stressed the importance of ‘ardent patriotism’, a ‘burning hatred against the enemy’ and a ‘lofty revolutionary spirit’,[11] revealing his strong belief in the power of a single anthem to induce such powerful states of mind among a populace. The resulting anthem “Song of General Kim Il Sung” composed in 1946 by Kim Won’gyun captured the attention of the supreme leader not only because of its nationalistic sentiments in praising the glories of a liberated country, but also in its unsubtle recognition of Kim Il-sung as the state’s leader, detailing his acts of saving the people from a ‘metaphorical wilderness’.[12]

Music was engrained further into the process of developing a new proletarian identity through North Korea’s education system. A further example of Kim’s utilisation of music to alter states of mind can be seen in his curriculum overhaul for an orphanage school in January 1949, recommending that the students raise spirits by a ‘regiment of sports and study of musical instruments’.[13] Adam Cathcart points us to the ‘Song of Youth’ as an archetype for a state-approved piece of music used in contexts such as this. While the ‘Song of Youth’ utilises an Italian tempo marking and five-staff notation reflecting the impact of Japanese and Christian missionaries, the prevailing themes are highly curated to fit Kim’s state vision. Strength, resistance and the deliberate omission of mentioning Stalin or the Soviet Union are themes that run throughout the song, accompanied by an uplifting, strident music in G major driven by dotted rhythms evoking the spirits of optimism and hope. Music was to become an integral part of the North Korean curriculum, with Kim expecting an investment in the training of young musicians to reap beneficial musical rewards for the state. However, the search for suitable teachers became increasingly difficult due to the rarity of teachers combining musical qualifications with unwavering conformity to ideology. Kim’s solution to this was the foundation of the Pyongyang Teachers’ Training College, aiming to ‘detect’ and ‘purge’ the ‘impure and alien elements among the teaching staff and students’.[14] Songs were not only a desired output of the musical curriculum, but also a key teaching methodology used in the general curriculum. While books were in short supply, songs provided the ideal medium for transmitting knowledge quickly and effectively, becoming an efficient vehicle for spreading ideology, as well as promoting the use of the Korean language over the foreign languages of its oppressors in the forms of spoken Japanese or written Chinese hanja.

Following the Korean war, policymakers in North Korea found it essential to distance the country as far as possible from the Soviets, following Sino-Soviet tensions after the death of Stalin. From 1957, the ch’ollima undong, or ‘galloping horse movement’ was set in motion, aiming to enhance all aspects of indigenous production. While rapid industrial and economic expansion was taking place, art and culture felt the effects of the galloping horse movement through the increased grip of central control at the hands of Kim Il Sung, through the yuil sasang philosophy, or ‘ideology of one’. To enact this distancing from the Soviets, Kim decreed it compulsory that Korean heritage had to form the basis of contemporary cultural production, with music utilising folksong based on fieldwork, for example. High culture of the past was to be abandoned, due to his belief told in a 1960 speech that ‘the people could write better works than professional [musicians] confined to their offices’. In terms of sound, the Committee for the Improvement of People’s instruments was founded to modify traditional Korean instruments with the latest in instrumental technology, allowing traditional instruments to compete alongside their Western, modern equivalents in large, combined ensembles. The committee also removed traditional court instruments such as the Ajaeng and Komun’go (types of zither) due to their links with the elite, a direct opposition of principles integral to the ‘ideology of one’. Anna Seonglim Noh notes the selective nature of approved culture in the DPRK compared to Lenin’s concept of culture, defined by its narrow boundaries determining something as elitist or proletarian, highlighting the use of the term ‘Minjok, which designates a nation as one constructed of ‘the ruled masses’, instead of Jeontong, a general term for ‘tradition’ in Korean.[15] The most puzzling and somewhat contradictory element of the galloping horse movement in the 1960s was Kim’s insistence on the enhancement of indigenously produced goods across the economy, yet in culture he chose a method of bolstering a national identity through adopting western musical techniques and technologies – a promotion of preservation or modernisation? Noh draws us to Kim’s pronouncement in the early 1960s, where ‘true national music should accommodate the progressive elements found in western music within Korean traditional music’, noting ‘limited melodic scales’ and ‘lack of harmonic unity’[16] as barriers to music’s effectiveness as a vehicle for ideology through a nationally embraced medium. Perhaps this willingness to adapt to western ideas and accept elements of international culture foreshadowed the internationalization efforts of the modern Kim Jong-un era, in its incorporation of cultural diplomacy.

Since Kim Jong-un came into power, North Korea’s cultural focus has evolved from the inwardly looking galloping horse movement, to the inclusion of contrasting outward engagements in cultural diplomacy, defined as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, language and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’.[17] 2012 was a particularly active year for North Korean cultural diplomacy, with the state Unhasu symphony orchestra travelling to give concerts in France, as well as the “Sea of Blood” opera company touring throughout China. The success of cultural diplomacy can be measured by the number of official partnerships made between North Korean and International bodies, such with the France Radio Orchestra or US Associated Press News Agency. However, this is not to say the DPRK silo has been opened to the world – such activities of cultural diplomacy are not without their tactics. The great push for international cultural collaboration coincided with the DPRK’s extreme activity in testing missiles on the 13th of April 2012, a significant event on the world stage to the detriment of Kim Jong-un’s international reputation. Adam Cathcart and Steven Denney note the potential of all seemingly genuine attempts at internationalization in the DPRK, whether in culture, tourism or otherwise to be ‘feigned’.[18] From the lack of almost any reliable information coming from inside the DPRK, the difficulty of knowing the true effect on, and attitudes of, North Korean citizens in relation to these broad displays of cultural diplomacy is evident.

Despite these difficulties, the concepts of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power are key ideas in international relations theory, that can be applied with certainty to the activities of the DPRK throughout its history. While hard power resembles the earlier efforts of the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il eras in prioritising the militarisation of society, and building national discipline through ‘stick and carrot’ methods of enacting power, the Kim Jong-un era has since explored the avenues of ‘soft power’ by which a state uses ‘attraction’ in dealing with other nations, to tackle negotiations ‘without the use of coercion or inducement’.[19] Peaceful projection is a powerful tool on the contemporary world stage, with “attraction” being facilitated without the need for military force or economic sanctions, but with the richness of cultural resources as a currency of international exchange. North Korea’s engagement in soft power arose in its strategy for cultural diplomacy during the Korean War, in attempts to receive donations for the home front through a musical European tour. In 1952 the DPRK state chorus, children’s choir and wounded veterans from the Korean People’s Army toured to Germany, proving to be effective in collecting donations from audiences for the war effort. Cultural diplomacy can operate both ways – in a more recent example from 2008, US-DPRK relations were said to have been considerably improved after its rocky history through the New York Philharmonic being allowed to visit the country and perform, in an event heavily covered by the world press.

Increased global surveillance and the strong influence of the press through rapid information distribution has required the North Korean regime to implement strategies of soft power and cultural diplomacy, attempting to prove to the world there is more to the DPRK than its ‘intimidating militant façade’[20] cultivated through the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il eras. Therefore, the timing of its engagements in cultural diplomacy are key, with the clearest example of calculated timing being the offsetting of the April 2012 global media unrest after a missile test with the Unhasu Orchestra’s concert in Paris. It is no coincidence that the conductor of the French National Radio Symphony orchestra is Chung Kyong-hwa, a well-known figure for speaking openly about the need for more musical collaboration over the 38th parallel, an ideal vehicle for North Korea’s ‘drive toward normalisation with Pyongyang’.[21] Despite the engagement of the orchestra with Western composers such as Brahms and Saint-Saëns, there is a ‘100 percent chance’[22] the North Korean state media would have reported the tour as being a success for the DPRK in spreading the ‘news of the Kimist renaissance’[23] to the world, serving cultural diplomacy as having a dual purpose: improving international relations and North Korea’s global reputation, as well as strengthening the cult ideology domestically. Perhaps the DPRK’s strategy for cultural diplomacy can be explained best through the analogy of a valve – cultural content can flow outward, but foreign content is blocked from being received back into the country. However, as Joseph Nye points out, North Korea, ‘like all countries – is not immune from the laws of soft power’[24], suggesting the valve of cultural diplomacy is not 100% immune from malfunctioning, allowing inward flows of information.

For a communist country in particular, the defence from the influences and soft power of other nations, mainly powerful capitalist economies such as the US, is equally important as enacting their own soft power. For North Korea, this threat cannot be left unaddressed in the internet age, where ever-expanding technologies of content distribution have greatly amplified the influence of soft power globally, to the potential detriment of such a societally engrained Kimist ideology. This has required Kim Jong-un to rapidly modernise, to tackle these threats at the source by releasing state-approved culture to the world through YouTube and its equivalents. Today we have the ability to watch North Korean documentaries, the Pyongyang news, as well as published concerts and songs. The analogy of the valve also applies to the internet, with the state having full control over what is uploaded, while restricting all unapproved outside content from being downloaded by its citizens, for its ‘contaminating effect’.[25] With the development of new technologies seen as essential for North Korea to maintain relevance, the vehicle for updating musical culture in the internet age emerged in the form of the Moranbong Band in 2012.

Kim Jong-il’s previously established popular music ensembles, the Wangjaesan Light Music band and the Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble, had been active since the 1980s, with their original purpose being to serve ‘light’ music to foreign visitors and diplomats, with a wide variety of popular hits from around the world. Since the 1980s, their focus was adapted to support the regime with stronger ideological content and ‘attractive modern melodies for legitimizing Kim Jong-il’s reign’.[26] However, this stronger politicized music took the form of songs suitable for military orchestras, rather than the broader population of North Korean Society. With rapid developments being made in other sectors since Kim Jong-un’s reign, it was inevitable that the Moranbong Band was founded as a ‘tactical innovation’[27], to include music in Kim Jong-un’s upheaval of society, for young people to feel more related to the musicians presented to them. Certain traditional elements remained in the foundation of the band – for example, ‘Moranbong’ refers to a central park in Pyongyang, where Kim Il-sung was reported to have given a national address in 1945 after returning from exile, remaining consistent with the previous popular music ensembles named after famous locations in Kim Il-sung’s life (Pochonbo, Wangjaesan). Kim Jong-un also has complete creative control over the most micro-level details of performances by hand selecting each member, deciding concert themes and the way they are expected to act on stage. The Moranbong have great influence on the domestic side of the cultural valve, shaping popular opinion on major events. For example, the rocket launch of 2012 required a song from the Moranbong Band to turn the domestic atmosphere into one of celebration, contrasting the fear and anger from the international community. The song “Dansume” filled this purpose – an uptempo ‘European disco beat suitable for contemporary dancing’,[28] accompanied by a celebratory yet sinister video portraying the launch of a nuclear missile towards the United States, before the entire world is consumed by an explosion – a strange juxtaposition of energetic dance music and visual depictions of a nuclear apocalypse. Moreover, the true purpose of the rocket, of delivering the Gwangmyeongseong 3-2 satellite into orbit was deliberately obscured for the sensationalism of visually demonstrating military prowess.

Since 2014, the Moranbong followed a similar path to the Pochonbo and Wangjaesan ensembles, becoming more traditional and propaganda-focused, often combining with the military State Merited Chorus, leading to the individualist expressive personalities of the earlier band being suppressed into an identical, homogenous mass. Despite this conservative evolution, the Moranbong Band was a key demonstration of music’s heavy involvement in Kim Jong-un’s revolutionary policies. The young supreme leader was keen to continue the trend of his predecessors, in generating nationalistic spirit, while at the same time communicating to the world that North Korea is a thriving and attractive place, through these brief moments of musical Westernization, liberalisation of Moranbong’s approved clothing, and himself publicly appearing to enjoy the shows. Not only do these musical developments broadcast North Korea’s culture to the world, they also serve the purpose of suggesting to its domestic residents that their own culture is just as good, if not better than any cultural content they could somehow acquire from the Western capitalist world.

Bibliography

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[1] G. Cain, 2021. Playing "jazz" is a crime in North Korea. [online] Salon. Available at: <https://www.salon.com/2013/07/24/playing_jazz_is_a_crime_in_north_korea_partner/> [Accessed 22 April 2021].

[2] Ibid

[3] A. Cathcart, 2008. ‘Song of Youth: North Korean Music from Liberation to War’. North Korean Review, 4(2), p.95

[4] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 236.

[5] A. Cathcart, 2008 p.95

[6] Kim Jong Il, Selected Works, Volume 1, 1964–1969, Vol. I, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992, pp. 27–34.

[7] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. III, pp. 21–24

[8] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. IV, pp. 91–93.

[9] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. II, p. 299.

[10] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. IV, p. 401.

[11] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. II, pp. 402–403.

[12] A. Cathcart, 2008 p.99

[13] Ibid p.100

[14] Kim Il Sung, Works, Vol. IV, pp. 5–7

[15] A.S Noh, 2019. ‘Cultural policies for national music in South and North Korea (1960s-70s): a comparative study’. International journal of cultural policy : CP, 25(1)

[16] Ibid p.25

[17] M. Waller, 2009. ‘Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence, and Integrated Strategy’. In: M. Waller, ed., Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare. Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, p.74.

[18] A. Cathcart, & S. Denney, 2013. ‘North Korea's Cultural Diplomacy in the Early Kim Jong-un Era’. North Korean Review, 9(2), p.30

[19] Ibid, p.30

[20] Ibid, p.33

[21] Ibid, p.37

[22] Ibid, p.39

[23] Ibid, p.38

[24] J.S Nye, 1990. Bound to lead : the changing nature of American power, New York.

[25] Pekka Korhonen & Adam Cathcart, 2017. ‘Tradition and Legitimation in North Korea: The Role of the Moranbong Band’. The Review of Korean Studies, 20(2), p.8

[26] Ibid p.10

[27] Ibid p.10

[28] Ibid p.19